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SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Procedure. State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997).
As long as probable cause exists to justify a detention, the subjec-
tive intentions of the police in executing a stop are immaterial.
Prior to State v. Bjerke, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
never addressed the validity of pretextual stops. Under the rule
adopted in Bjerke, a police detention is valid as long as probable
cause exists to execute the stop, regardless of whether the motive
of the police for stopping the suspect was to investigate some other
crime for which the requisite level of suspicion was lacking.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On April 27, 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the War-
wick Police Department that the driver of a tan Oldsmobile with
license plate number TV-536 was possibly intoxicated.1 An officer
investigated while the dispatcher ran a vehicle registration check
and discovered that the registration had been suspended. The dis-
patcher relayed this information to the responding officer.2
The officer located and stopped the vehicle in the Post Road
area of Warwick, Rhode Island. The officer approached the driver,
Robert Bjerke (Bjerke) and asked for Bjerke's license, registration
and proof of insurance.3 A license check revealed that it was sus-
pended. The officer noticed an odor of alcohol and Bjerke's words
were slurred and confused. The officer asked Bjerke to step out of
the car in order to perform some field sobriety tests, which Bjerke
failed. 4 Bjerke was arrested and brought to the Warwick police
station, where he refused to submit to a chemical breath test.5 He
was then charged with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended
1. See State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1070 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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license,6 operating a motor vehicle with a suspended registration7
and refusing to submit to a chemical test.8
At an Administrative Adjudicative Court (AAC) hearing on
November 15, 1995, the trial judge found Bjerke guilty of driving a
vehicle with a suspended license, but dismissed the chemical-test
charge.9 The judge reasoned that reasonable suspicion existed to
stop Bjerke for operating the vehicle because of the suspended re-
gistration.10 However, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop the car to investigate possible drunk driving. Therefore, any-
thing discovered after the stop relating to drunk driving was
inadmissable. 11
The State appealed the dismissal of the chemical-test charge,
and Bjerke appealed his conviction on the suspended-registration
charge. 12 The AAC Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge's deci-
sion.' 3 The panel concluded that an anonymous phone tip alone
was insufficient to trigger reasonable suspicion. The State peti-
tioned the Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
which was granted on June 27, 1996.14
State v. Bjerke, a case of first impression, asked the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court to consider the validity of pretextual stops. A
pretextual stop occurs when a police officer pulls over a vehicle be-
cause of one infraction, generally a minor traffic-code violation,
while the underlying reason for the stop is to investigate suspi-
6. See id. The pertinent section of the law reads "Ia]ny person who drives a
motor vehicle on any highway of this state after his or her application for a license
has been refused, or at a time when his or her license to operate is suspended,
revoked, or canceled ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-
11-18(a) (1996).
7. See Bjerke, 697 A.2d at 1070. The law with respect to suspended registra-
tions reads "[nlo person shall operate, nor shall an owner knowingly permit to be
operated, upon any highway, a motor vehicle the registration of which has been
canceled, suspended, or revoked. Any violation of this section is a misdemeanor."
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-8-2 (1996).
8. See Bjerke, 697 A.2d at 1070; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.1 (1996)
(refusal to submit to a chemical test).
9. See Bjerke, 697 A.2d at 1070. These were the only two charges over which
the AAC retained jurisdiction. See id. The driving on a suspended license charge
was handled by district court.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 1071.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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cions of other criminal activity for which the police lack reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to execute a stop.15
Justice Bourcier delivered the unanimous opinion of the
court. 16 This case centers on the validity of the police stopping an
automobile.17 Accordingly, the court sketched the framework of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution' and Arti-
cle 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution,' 9 which this case
implicates. 20 The court explained, consistent with a long line of
United States Supreme Court precedent, that "reasonableness is
the touchstone for distinguishing lawful from unlawful seizures."21
The court reviewed the levels of suspicion necessary to support
various forms of government intrusion.22 If probable cause ex-
ists-"where a reasonable man of caution would believe a suspect
had committed or is committing an offense"-then the police can
make an arrest.23 Reasonable suspicion justifying a brief deten-
tion exists when authorities "can 'point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" 24
15. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). Whren presents
the classic pretextual stop scenario. In Whren, plain-clothes police officers executed
a stop to enforce traffic regulations. The police had observed a truck filled with
youths in a high drug use area which made them suspicious. The truck's driver
made a right hand turn without using the turn signal. The plain-clothes police-
men then pulled the truck over for the traffic violation and noticed two bags of
crack cocaine inside. Id.
16. See Bjerke, 697 A.2d at 1070 (noting that Justice Goldberg did not
participate).
17. See id.
18. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
19. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers and pos-
sessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated: and no warrant shall issue, but on complaint in writing, upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing as nearly
as may be, the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
R.I. Const. art. 1, § 6.
20. See Bjerke, 697 A.2d at 1071.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
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The court corrected the AAC Appeals Panel's misapplication of
the law. 25 The panel had found that lack of reasonable suspicion of
drunken driving doomed Bjerke's arrest.26 The court pointed out
that at the time of the stop, the officer had probable cause to stop
the vehicle and arrest Bjerke for driving a car with a suspended
registration. 27 Once the automobile was legally stopped, all indicia
of drunk driving was in plain view.28 Thus, the lack of reasonable
suspicion of drunken driving attached to an anonymous tip was of
no importance because probable cause of another crime existed. 29
The court summed up its position by saying:
To conclude piecemeal, as the panel did, that the probable
cause that justified the stop was irrelevant, would have the
perverse effect of permitting an intoxicated driver to escape
prosecution merely because he was stopped for a separate
and different motor vehicle violation. Common sense mili-
tates against such disparate analysis.30
Next, the court addressed the defendant's claim that the stop
was really a pretext to investigate criminal behavior for which the
officer could not otherwise stop him.31 The court, adopting Whren
v. United States, rejected the notion that the pretextual nature of a
stop is fatal.3 2 Instead, the court held that "[any subjective moti-
vation in effecting a traffic stop based upon probable cause does not
alter our Fourth Amendment analysis."33 Therefore, as long as po-
lice have the requisite level of suspicion to intrude upon a privacy
interest, the fact that the intrusion is really to investigate another
matter entirely is of no import.
The court then turned to the defendant's contention that the
computer check of his license plate was a search.34 Bjerke argued
that because police lacked the requisite amount of suspicion to sup-
port the search, the evidence collected was inadmissable.35 The
court firmly rejected this idea. It reasoned that no search occurred
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1071-72.
27. See id. at 1072.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id. (adopting Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996)).
33. Id. at 1073.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy since regis-
tration information is within the control of the State.36 The de-
fendant also urged the court to find that the police officer's reading
of the license plate was also a search. 37 The court rejected this
request, stating "there can be no expectation of privacy in one's
license plate when it hangs from the front and rear of one's vehicle
for all the world to see."38
Finally, the court declined to offer greater protection under the
Rhode Island Constitution than is afforded under the United
States Constitution because "a decision declaring the police activ-
ity in this case unconstitutional would be unprincipled and
unwarranted."39
CONCLUSION
The importance of this case is unmistakable-police have
broad discretion to stop anyone suspected of criminal activity so
long as the police can forward some "technical violation" which
supports the stop. The court will not analyze the subjective intent
of the police so long as probable cause is present.
Armando Batastini
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Dellay, 687 A.2d 435 (R.I. 1996).
When a defendant asserts self-defense in a murder case, evidence
of the victim's prior specific acts of violent or aggressive behavior is
admissible if the defendant was aware of these acts during the con-
frontation, and based on that knowledge, the defendant reasonably
feared imminent bodily harm by the victim.
In State v. Dellay,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
asked to extend its holding in State v. Tribble,2 which set out the
rule governing the admissibility of specific prior bad acts of a vic-
tim when a murder defendant argues self-defense. 3 The supreme
court in Dellay declined to allow the introduction of such evidence
if the defendant had no knowledge of these acts at the time of the
killing, thereby leaving Tribble intact and solidifying the rationale
underlying the rule. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 26, 1992, the defendant, Lance Dellay (Dellay), mur-
dered Todd Ricci (Ricci) by beating him to death with a baseball
bat.5 Ricci shared an apartment with Dellay and Ricci's girlfriend,
Stacey Lonsdale (Lonsdale), in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Dellay
also collected and delivered drugs on Ricci's behalf in return for
free rent and $200 per week.6 On the morning of June 26, 1992, all
three roommates were in the apartment, along with Keith Allard
(Allard), a friend who had spent the night.7 At trial, Lonsdale and
Dellay testified to two different versions of the events leading to
the killing of Ricci.8
Lonsdale testified that on the morning of the murder, she
heard Ricci crying in another room in the apartment, but assumed
that he was just "joking around."9 Lonsdale then noticed Ricci and
Dellay were gone, the apartment door was open and Allard was
1. 687 A.2d 435 (R.I. 1996).
2. 428 A.2d 1079 (R.I. 1981).
3. See De~lay, 687 A.2d at 438.
4. Id. at 438-39.
5. See id. at 436.
6. See id. at 435.
7. See id. at 436.
8. See id.
9. Id.
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cleaning up blood in the living room.10 Lonsdale further testified
that soon thereafter Dellay came upstairs to the apartment "cov-
ered in blood and carrying a baseball bat."" Lonsdale stated that
she then ran down the basement stairs where she found Ricci
mumbling for help-he was "covered in blood" and had "a big bump
on his head."' 2 At this point, Ricci was still "conscious and mutter-
ing for help."' 3 According to Lonsdale, Dellay then came down the
stairs and hit Ricci in the head and ribs with the bat. After wit-
nessing this, Lonsdale ran upstairs. 14 Lonsdale testified that
when Dellay re-entered the apartment, he had Ricci's wallet, from
which he took $1500, giving $100 to Lonsdale.15
Dellay's version of the circumstances surrounding Ricci's
death was markedly dissimilar. Dellay testified that on the morn-
ing of the murder, he asked Ricci for money, which Dellay said
Ricci had withheld from him from the drug collections and deliv-
eries. 16 According to Dellay, Ricci became upset at this,
threatened to kill Dellay and then "came at" Dellay with a base-
ball bat. 17 Somehow Ricci lost possession of the bat and Dellay
retrieved it.'1 Dellay testified that he swung the bat at Ricci when
Ricci came at him a second time with a milk crate. Believing Ricci
was dead, Dellay dragged Ricci's body to the basement. Contrary
to Lonsdale's testimony, Dellay denied hitting Ricci while Ricci
was on the stairs. 19
Later in the afternoon, Dellay and Allard dropped Lonsdale off
at her parents' home in North Attleboro, Massachusetts. 20 Dellay
and Allard took to the task of disposing of Ricci's body. Two days
later, on June 28, 1992, Lonsdale gave a statement to the North
Attleboro Police Department regarding the circumstances of Ricci's
death.21
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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At trial, Carrie Bestwick (Bestwick) testified that she had spo-
ken with Dellay in late June of 1992 outside a North Attleboro
doughnut shop.22 Dellay told Bestwick that he had killed Ricci
with a baseball bat because Ricci had "pissed [him] off so much [he]
just couldn't stop."23 Bestwick and two friends eventually drove
Dellay and Allard to a Montreal hotel. 24
Dellay was arrested in Montreal on July 1, 1992, and gave a
statement to the Montreal Police Department indicating that he
had hit Ricci in self-defense. 25 Extradition was waived and Dellay
was returned to the United States. On October 30, 1992, Dellay
was formally charged by indictment with Ricci's murder, felony
larceny and failure to report a death.26
In support of his self-defense claim, Dellay sought to introduce
evidence of Ricci's violent reputation, as well as evidence of Ricci's
previous violent acts, to establish that Ricci was indeed the initial
aggressor on the morning of June 26, 1992.27 The State responded
with a motion in limine to exclude the "specific-act" evidence un-
less Dellay could demonstrate that he "was aware of those acts at
the time he struck [Ricci]."28
Dellay argued that specific acts are admissible under Rule
405(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, regardless of Dellay's
knowledge of those acts.29 The trial judge ruled that specific acts
"could be inquired into on cross-examination" pursuant to Rule
405(a).30 Furthermore, the trial judge ruled that, if the specific
facts offered under Rule 404(b) show "that [Dellay] feared immi-
nent bodily harm, and that fear was reasonable based on" knowl-
edge of prior instances of bad conduct, then such prior acts could be
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. (noting that pursuant to Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure Rule 48(a), the third charge was dismissed).
27. See id. at 436-37.
28. Id. at 437.
29. See id. Rule 405(b) provides in pertinent part: "(b) Specific Instances of
Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait [of] character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, or when evidence is offered under
Rule 404(b), proof may also be made of specific instances of the person's conduct.
R.I. R. Evid. 405(b)."
30. Dellay, 687 A.2d at 437.
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admitted under Rule 405(b).3 1 However, evidence of "specific in-
stances of bad conduct not known to [Dellay] at the time of confron-
tation would not be admissible under either Rule 404 or Rule
405."32
During trial, defense witnesses who testified as to Ricci's repu-
tation as an aggressive and volatile individual were not allowed to
testify about specific acts by Ricci which helped those witnesses
form their opinions of his character.33 Dellay cited the trial judge's
exclusion of evidence of Ricci's prior specific bad acts as error.3 4
BACKGROUND
In Rhode Island prior to the 1981 case of State v. Tribble,35 if
self-defense was asserted, then prior specific acts of violence by the
victim against third persons were not admissible to prove the vic-
tim's bad character.3 6 However, in 1981, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court re-examined and altered this rule when it held in
Tribble that a defendant who pleads self-defense is entitled to offer
relevant evidence of a victim's specific acts of violence "against
third parties, provided however, that the defendant was aware of
these acts at the time of his encounter with the victim."37
The Tribble court further noted that this newly espoused rule
had limited application.38 Specifically, the court commanded that
31. Id. Rule 404(b) provides:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to
prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that fear was
reasonable.
R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).
32. Dellay, 687 A.2d at 437.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. 428 A.2d 1079 (1981).
36. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 417 A.2d 906, 911 (R.I. 1980) (reaffirming the rule
that proof of bad character is limited to general reputation evidence).
37. Tribble, 428 A.2d at 1085 (emphasis added). The court rationalized its
position by articulating the purpose of the rules of evidence that the fact-finder
"will have before it all relevant, reliable, and probative evidence on the issues in
dispute. Evidence of specific acts of violence committed by the victim against third
parties of which acts the defendant was aware would enlighten the jury on the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the confrontation." Id.
38. See id.
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when such evidence is introduced at trial, the jury must be warned
that it can "only... be considered with regard to the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's fear that the victim was about to inflict bod-
ily harm upon him."39 Furthermore, this evidence cannot be
considered in establishing whether the victim acted in conformity
with those prior violent acts on the occasion in question.40
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The Dellay court first addressed the defendant's contention
that, when read together, Rules 404(a)(2) and 405(b) allow the in-
troduction of the victim's specific acts, regardless of the defendant's
knowledge of those acts, to show that the victim was the aggressor
in the incident in question.41 The court briefly described the his-
torical progression of the common-law rule governing the admissi-
bility of specific acts. 42 Specifically, the court noted "that proof of
bad character [of the victim could] be shown only by general repu-
tation and not by specific acts of misconduct."43 The court noted its
reconsideration of this rule in Tribble and proceeded to set out its
holding.44
The Dellay court noted that Dellay had asked for an extension
of Tribble, which would require dispensing with the requirement
that the defendant must have knowledge of the victim's prior ag-
gressive or violent acts.45 The court agreed with Dellay's position
that a defendant's awareness of the victim's violent character is
irrelevant in determining who was the aggressor.46 The court dis-
agreed, however, with the argument that the tandem of Rules
404(a)(2) and 405(b) combined to allow introduction of specific in-
stances of violence because the victim's character is an essential
element of self-defense.47
The court stated that in Rhode Island, self-defense "eoes not
require proof that the victim was the initial aggressor" in order to
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Dellay, 687 A.2d at 437. Dellay claimed that this position was supported
by the fact that a victim's character "is an essential element of... self-defense." Id.
42. See id. at 437-48.
43. Id. at 438 (quoting State v. Baker, 417 A.2d 906, 911 (R.I. 1980)).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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be sustained.48 Quoting State v. D'Amario,49 the court stated that
a person is not required to wait for the other to strike the first blow
so long as that person reasonably believes there is an "imminent
danger of bodily harm" from the other.50 The court thereby con-
cluded that, "because the character of the victim is not an essential
element of the defense of self-defense, evidence of the victim's char-
acter is appropriately limited to reputation or opinion
testimony."5 '
CONCLUSION
The holding in Dellay firmly cemented the bounds within
which a defendant can introduce character evidence of his murder
victim in order to support his self-defense argument. This rule can
best be summarized as a two-prong test. Evidence of specific prior
bad acts of aggressive or violent behavior of the victim are admissi-
ble only when (1) the defendant was aware of these acts at the time
of the confrontation and (2) based on this knowledge, the defend-
ant reasonably feared imminent bodily harm by the victim. 52
Hence, where the defendant claims self-defense, he cannot look
backward in time to justify the killing on the basis of the victim's
prior violent acts, about which the defendant knew nothing at the
time of the killing. As Justice Murray stated in Tribble:
It is only logical to conclude that when the defendant is una-
ware of the victim's specific acts of violence at the time of the
incident such evidence sheds no light whatsoever on whether
the defendant harbored a reasonable fear of imminent bodily
harm at the hands of the victim. However, when the defend-
ant is aware, at the time of the confrontation, of prior specific
acts of violence committed by the victim against a third party,
as in the instant case, evidence of such awareness may be
highly relevant to the question of the reasonableness of the
defendant's fear of imminent bodily injury at the hands of the
victim.
5 3
48. Id.
49. 568 A.2d 1383 (R.I. 1990).
50. Dellay, 687 A.2d at 438.
51. Id. Dellay's final argument, that Rule 404(b) permitted evidence of Ricci's
prior violent acts, was refuted by the court's invocation of Tribble as the "control-
ling" rule of law, a rule that the court once again declined to expand. Id. at 438-39.
52. See id.
53. Tribble, 428 A.2d at 1083.
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In Dellay, the lack of any knowledge by Dellay of Ricci's prior
specific acts of aggressive behavior failed to satisfy the two-prong
test, as well as Justice Murray's poignantly worded rationale.
Michael F. Drywa, Jr.
19981 SURVEY SECTION 467
Criminal Procedure. State v. Gabriau, 696 A.2d 290 (R.I. 1997).
In determining the admissibility of deoxyribonucleic (DNA) evi-
dence to show the probability of a match between a criminal de-
fendant's DNA and the DNA of various racial groups, the burden of
showing a genuine issue of dispute as to the defendant's race lies
with the defendant once the trial judge has notified defense coun-
sel of the judge's perception of the defendant's apparent racial
group.
In State v. Gabriau,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
asked to set aside the rape conviction of a defendant whose convic-
tion was obtained with the assistance of DNA evidence. 2 The de-
fendant contended that the DNA evidence offered was irrelevant,
and therefore inadmissible, because it only included match
probabilities for Caucasian, African-American and Hispanic popu-
lations, while excluding Native American and Asian populations. 3
The supreme court, noting that the trial judge had notified defense
counsel that the defendant did not "appear to be anything other
than Caucasian,"4 held that once defense counsel is so notified, the
burden then shifts to the defense to show that the defendant's race
is a genuine issue of dispute.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On Memorial Day Weekend in 1991, seventeen-year old Clau-
dia Doe (Claudia) completed classes at the Newport Hairdressing
School and planned for Tracy Green, her friend, to stop by after
school. 6 Tracy arrived at approximately 3:45 p.m. accompanied by
Jessica Brown (Jessica) and Jessica's "Uncle Ed."7 Claudia esti-
mated Jessica's age at about sixteen, and Uncle Ed's age to be be-
tween thirty-five and forty-years old.8
The four went to Jessica's father's home located in West War-
wick.9 They entered through the kitchen where they encountered
1. 696 A.2d 290 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. at 291-93.
3. See id. at 293.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 295.
6. See id. at 291.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
468 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387
Uncle Ed's father (also named Ed) and Joseph Gabriau
(Gabriau)-Jessica's father and the defendant in this case.' 0 The
elder Ed and Gabriau were drinking beer, and after the girls took a
seat at the table, Jessica made a drink for Claudia at Gabriau's
request." Claudia testified that she had at least two drinks.
Thereafter, Gabriau recommended that they go to a liquor store to
purchase additional alcohol. On the drive back, Claudia had
Gabriau stop driving so she could vomit.12
After returning to Gabriau's home, Jessica and Tracy "told
Claudia that Claudia's boyfriend had kissed Jessica."13 Upon
hearing this, Claudia telephoned her boyfriend to verify the story.
Claudia stated that she passed out at the kitchen table after this
phone call and that Jessica and Gabriau later helped her to a fold-
out chair which was set up in the living room.' 4 At that point, ac-
cording to Claudia, "she either passed out or fell asleep."' 5
When Claudia awoke, Gabriau was holding her down. Her
pants and underwear were off and her shirt and bra were pushed
up.' 6 Claudia testified that she screamed and unsuccessfully tried
to push Gabriau off of her. 17 Gabriau then forced Claudia to have
vaginal and anal intercourse until someone entered from the ad-
joining room.' s At that point, Gabriau left the room and Claudia
put her underwear and shorts on. She then ran out of the home
through the kitchen to a nearby house where she called the police.
Claudia testified that she heard people laughing as she fled
Gabriau's home.19
When West Warwick police officers arrived, they found Clau-
dia crying hysterically on the side of the road.20 She had no shoes
on, her bra was pushed up over her breasts and her shorts were
unzipped.2 ' Claudia indicated to the officers that Gabriau had just
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 291-92.
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raped her.22 The officers then took her to Kent County Hospital for
a rape examination where it was noted that she had abrasions on
her "knees, forearms, neck, and the left side of her head."23 Evi-
dence swabs were taken from Claudia as part of the examination
and then sent to the Forensic Serology Laboratory at the Depart-
ment of Health. Tests indicated the presence of sperm on the vagi-
nal and rectal swabs. Gabriau's blood-acquired pursuant to a
warrant-was sent along with the swabs to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation laboratory for DNA analysis.24 The trial judge con-
ducted a preliminary hearing to decide the admissibility of the
DNA analysis results and determined that these results could be
admitted at trial.25
While executing a search and arrest warrant the following
Monday, police officers arrested Gabriau, who was hiding in the
cellar of his building. 26 They also seized a sweater and a shoe,
both identified as Claudia's during the trial, as well as the fold-out
chair where the alleged rape had occurred. 27
During the trial, FBI Special Agent Linda Harrison was quali-
fied as an expert.28 She testified that there was a DNA match at
two genetic loci of Gabriau's blood sample and the sperm in the
evidence swabs taken from Claudia. She also testified that the
tests were inconclusive at two other loci. 29 Agent Harrison used
the product rule30 to calculate "the probability that a random, un-
related person might have a DNA profile matching that of
Gabriau."3 ' Harrison testified that based on her calculations, the
probability that an African American person would share
Gabriau's genetic profile was about 1 in 3300; a Caucasian per-
son-about 1 in 780; and a Hispanic person-about 1 in 520.32 Fi-
22. See id. at 292.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id. The supreme court noted that the trial in this case occurred prior
to the court's decision in State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1374 (R.I. 1996). See Gabriau,
696 A.2d at 290 at n.2. For a discussion of the DNA testing procedure and general
test for admissibility of this evidence as set out in Morel, see infra p. 3.
26. See Gabriau, 696 A.2d at 292,
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. For a discussion of the product rule, see infra p. 6.
31. Gabriau, 696 A.2d at 293.
32. See id.
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nally, Harrison testified that when encompassing all three
populations using the ceiling principle, "the probability that an un-
related individual would share a profile with Mr. Gabriau... [was]
approximately 1 in 297."33
After the DNA testimony had been admitted linking Gabriau
to the rape, Gabriau testified that the sex had been consensual and
that he had not had anal intercourse with Claudia.34 Defense
counsel hinted in closing arguments that Claudia had sex with
Gabriau because she was angry with her boyfriend. A jury found
Gabriau guilty on three counts of first-degree sexual assault.
Gabriau subsequently appealed, arguing that Agent Harrison's
testimony on the random match probability among racial groups
should have been excluded.35
BACKGROUND
In the 1996 case State v. Morel,36 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court confronted the issue of the admissibility of DNA evidence in
a criminal case involving the rape of a teen aged girl.3 7 Although
the admissibility of the type of DNA evidence involved in Gabriau
was not at issue, the Morel court's discussion of the product rule
and the ceiling principle sets out the parameters to measure
Gabriau's argument that the DNA evidence was irrelevant.38
Gabriau put forth that argument on the ground that Agent Harri-
son, in conducting her testing using both the product rule and ceil-
ing principle, failed to include either Native Americans or Asians
in her population database.39
The Morel court detailed the scientific background of the per-
formance of DNA testing as well as the general rules and methods
for determining the statistical application for matching DNA sam-
33. Id. For a discussion of the ceiling principle, see infra p.6.
34. See Gabriau, 696 A.2d at 293.
35. See id. Gabriau also raised a second issue on appeal concerning the trial
judge's refusal to allow admission of Claudia's prior vague statements regarding
her hearing of laughter in the kitchen as past recollection recorded. See id. at 295.
The court ultimately dismissed this argument on the ground that Rhode Island
Rule of Evidence 803 did not allow "a defendant to transform a prior inconsistent
statement into a memorandum of past recollection recorded." Id. at 298 (quoting
R.I. R. Evid. 803).
36. 676 A.2d 1347 (R.I. 1996).
37. See id. at 1349.
38. See id. at 1352-55.
39. See Gabriau, 696 A.2d at 293.
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ples.40 After this comprehensive description of the technicalities of
DNA testing, the Morel court discussed the application of the prod-
uct rule and the ceiling principle as methods for computing match
probabilities. 41 As the Morel court pointed out, the computation of
"the probability that a person selected at random from a compari-
son population would have a DNA profile that matches that of the
crime sample" is one of the most controversial aspects of the use of
DNA for forensic purposes.42
Prior to a discussion on the use of the product rule and the
ceiling principle, a short description of the mechanics of DNA test-
ing is necessary. Essentially, DNA analysis is conducted by com-
paring the size of genetic fragments, known as alleles. 43 These
fragments are obtained through a process known as electrophore-
sis, which is conducted on the DNA specimens." The result of this
process is a separation of the fragments by their various lengths.
Next, the array of DNA fragments goes though a procedure re-
ferred to as Southern blotting, where the fragments are trans-
ferred to a sheet of nylon for manageability. 45 Following this
procedure, the DNA is heated to denature it and separate "the hy-
drogen linked double helix into single DNA strands."46 A radioac-
tive probe is then applied to the membrane which allows testing
for alleles at different loci. Finally, the nylon sheet is inserted be-
tween sheets of photographic film.4 7 The probe's radioactivity
eventually exposes, or draws out, the DNA fragments which can be
seen in a "visual pattern of bands."48 This visual result is called an
autorad.49
After an autorad is obtained, the probe material is removed
and the entire process is repeated three to five times with different
probes, depending on the amount of DNA available for testing from
40. See Morel, 676 A.2d 1350-52.
41. See id. at 1352-53.
42. Id. at 1352.
43. See id. at 1350 (noting that a characteristic DNA sequence is situated at a
specific position, or locus, on a specific chromosome, while the various forms of a
gene at a specied locus are known as alleles).
44. See id. at 1351.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id. (noting that autorad is the short form for autoradiograph).
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the sample.50 From this procedure a set of autorads is produced,
each the result of a single probe.51 When considered together,
these autorads constitute a DNA fingerprint. 52
For comparison purposes, if DNA bands for the suspect appear
to be aligned on the autorad with DNA from the forensic sample,
then computer verification is performed to check the measure-
ment.53 A "match" is proclaimed if the two bands fall within a spe-
cific length, meaning that "the band patterns are consistent with
the conclusion that the two DNA samples had the same source."54
A calculation is then performed to determine the statistical likeli-
hood that someone else in the population would randomly have the
same DNA profile. It is the method of this calculation that is often
the basis for controversy. 55 The two methods discussed in Morel,
the product rule and the ceiling principle, are discussed briefly
below.
The Product Rule
The Morel court described the product rule method of DNA
match probability computation as the most straightforward
method.56 Basically, in order to obtain "the probability of a ran-
dom occurrence of a specific pattern of alleles . . . separate esti-
mated probabilities of the random occurrence of each allele in the
comparison population are multiplied."57 A risk exists in this cal-
culation that the true probability of a match could be overesti-
mated or underestimated, depending on whether the individual
allele frequencies are independent-that is "likely to occur to-
gether in a person."58 As a result, the calculation could "misstate
the incriminating value of the evidence."59
Some critics of the product rule contend that "members of sub-
groups tend to mate within their own subgroup."60 This mating,
50. See id.
51. See id at 1351-52.
52. See id. at 1352.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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they argue, results in population substructuring, altering the gene
frequencies and rendering the results obtained via the product rule
defective. 6 1
The Ceiling Principle
The ceiling principle addresses the substructure problem
raised by critics of the product rule.62 This method assumes that
substructures may exist and accounts for this in its population es-
timating procedure. 63  In employing the ceiling principle
probability match calculation, "the 95 percent upper confidence
limit... is first computed for each of the existing population sam-
ples" 64 Next, a "joint probability of a coincidental match" is calcu-
lated.65 The probabilities are then multiplied under the same
method as the product rule. This method of calculation yields a
probability that is conservative in favor of the defendant.66
In Morel, the State provided two expert witnesses who testi-
fied at a voir dire hearing on the issue of admissibility of DNA evi-
dence.67 The State's first expert, FBI Special Agent Lawrence
Presley (Presley) testified as to the probability of a random match
of the defendant's DNA to that of a person within the Caucasian
population. 68 According to Presley, under the product rule, there
was a one in one-thousand chance that defendant's DNA matched
a random person in the population, essentially "excluding 99.9 per-
cent of the Caucasian population unrelated to [the] defendant."69
Using the ceiling principle, 99.8 percent of the population would be
excluded, according to Presley. 70
The State's second expert, Kenneth Kidd, Ph.D. (Kidd), an ex-
pert in population genetics and molecular biology, testified that the
product rule "was the generally accepted procedure in the field of
population genetics."71 Kidd further testified that the ultraconser-
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1353.
64. Id. (noting that these populations may include Caucasian, Hispanic, Afri-
can American and Native American).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1353.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1353-54.
71. Id. at 1354.
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vative nature of the ceiling principle had a tendency "to obscure
the truth."72
When the hearing was concluded, the trial judge declared that
the product rule would be the method of DNA probability testing
that would be used at trial.73 At trial, Agent Presley testified to
the DNA evidence under the product rule.74 On appeal from his
conviction, the defendant in Morel contended that the trial judge
erred by allowing the jury to hear testimony of DNA matching evi-
dence under the product rule since that method, according to the
defendant, was "inherently unreliable."75 The supreme court dis-
missed this argument on the grounds that admission of DNA evi-
dence under the product rule was within the discretion of the trial
judge, who must consider whether such evidence will assist the
jury in making a decision.76 Furthermore, the court noted that the
method under which the FBI conducts its DNA testing yields con-
servative results that give "a defendant the benefit of any doubt
about the data."77 The Morel court concluded that the admissibil-
ity of such evidence was proper so long as the defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine experts in order to expose weak-
nesses in the DNA analysis.78
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In Gabriau, defense counsel cross-examined Agent Harrison
during a preliminary hearing concerning her testimony on the ran-
dom match probabilities.79 Harrison testified to the probability of
matches in African American, Caucasian and Hispanic popula-
tions. She conceded under defense examination that she had not
calculated probabilities for Native American or Asian populations
under either the product rule or ceiling principle methods of
probability calculation.80 The defense used this testimony to argue
that the DNA evidence might not include defendant's racial group
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id. 1354-55.
77. Id. at 1356.
78. Id.
79. Gabriau, 696 A.2d at 293.
80. See id.
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and was therefore inadmissible as irrelevant.8' The trial judge re-
sponded to this argument by stating that defendant did not "ap-
pear to be anything other than Caucasian."8 2
As in Morel, the Gabriau court indicated that the admissibility
of evidence is within the trial judge's sound discretion.83 The court
stated that once the trial judge had informed the defense of his
impression of the defendant's evident racial group, the burden
then fell upon the defendant to show that there existed an issue of
dispute as to defendant's race.8 4 Citing Morrison v. California,8 5
the court noted that "where the ability to challenge the trial jus-
tice's observation was uniquely within defendant's knowledge and
ability, it is especially appropriate to shift the burden of going for-
ward to defendant to lay the foundation for exclusion."86
The court noted that Gabriau made no effort to show that his
race was an issue in dispute.87 Gabriau's failure to introduce evi-
dence concerning his racial origin relieved the trial judge from con-
sidering defense counsel's argument that the DNA evidence was
irrelevant.88 As the court concluded: "For us to rule otherwise
would be to elevate every naked assertion by counsel into an issue
requiring proof by the state." 9 Gabriau's appeal was denied and
his conviction affirmed.90
CONCLUSION
In Gabriau, the issue of admissibility of DNA evidence was
tied, not to the reliability of such evidence as a forensic tool, but
rather to the method of matching the defendant's DNA to that of a
particular racial population.91 In this case, the defendant,
Gabriau, had argued that, since the DNA matching evidence had
only been provided for three racial groups, African American, Cau-
casian and Hispanic, the probabilities relating to a potential match
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 294.
84. See id.
85. 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
86. Gabriau, 696 A.2d at 295 (citing Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88-89).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 298.
91. Id. 293-95.
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in the two excluded groups, Native American and Asian, prevented
the results from being relevant, since Gabriau may have belonged
to one of those groups.92 However, once the trial judge commented
to defense counsel that Gabriau appeared to belong to the Cauca-
sian race, it then became the defense's burden to show that
Gabriau may have indeed belonged to the Asian or Native-Ameri-
can race.93 Without this evidence, the trial judge exercised his dis-
cretion to allow the DNA evidence to be offered.94
Michael F. Drywa, Jr.
92. See id. at 293.
93. See id. at 294.
94. See id.
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1997).
Although state action is invoked when a grand jury authorizes a
subpoena for medical records, no legitimate Fourth Amendment
privacy expectation exists in those records. Conversely, no state ac-
tion is involved concerning the withdrawal and testing of a defend-
ant's blood by hospital personnel and, therefore, no Fourth
Amendment concerns are triggered. Additionally, judicial access
to medical records cannot be constitutionally prohibited by the
Confidentiality of Health-Care Information Act. Finally, the se-
crecy of the grand-jury proceeding is not violated, nor is the grand
jury's role entirely usurped, if the medical records are turned over
to the Attorney General's office.
In State v. Guido,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a triad of issues on a defendant's appeal from a con-
viction for driving under the influence of alcohol. 2 In affirming the
conviction, the supreme court found that: (1) blood tests performed
pursuant to hospital protocol did not constitute state action and,
therefore, no Fourth Amendment protections arose;3 (2) the Confi-
dentiality of Health-Care Information Act was not intended to pre-
vent judicial access to medical records 4 and (3) no reversible error
existed where medical records obtained via a grand-jury subpoena
were provided directly to the Attorney General's office rather than
to the grand jury.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on May 15, 1993, Salvatore Guido
(Guido), and sixteen-year old Sarah Anderson (Anderson) collided
head-on as each operated their vehicles on Airport Road in West-
erly, Rhode Island.6 After pinned inside her vehicle for more than
an hour, Anderson was removed with the assistance of the "jaws of
life" and flown to Rhode Island Hospital by medical helicopter.7
1. 698 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. at 731.
3. See id. at 733.
4. See id. at 734.
5. See id. at 737.
6. See id. at 732.
7. See id.
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Anderson sustained broken ribs, bruised lungs, a fractured ankle
and wrist, and a dislocated hip.8
Police found Guido "unconscious [and] slumped across the
front seat of his vehicle."9 Guido was also flown to Rhode Island
Hospital where he was diagnosed in critical condition.10 He had
suffered two fractured legs and was severely bleeding. During his
emergency room treatment, a blood sample was drawn from Guido
to test for the presence of alcohol in accordance with hospital proto-
col. 1 The results of the blood test indicated that Guido's blood
contained an alcohol level of 0.203 percent, which is more than
twice the limit allowed under section 31-27-2(b)(1) of the Rhode Is-
land General Laws.' 2
At first, police did not know the cause of the accident.' 3 An-
derson was found pinned in her car and hysterical. She indicated
to police that she might have crossed the yellow line.' 4 Later, po-
lice discovered that Guido had been on his way home from a bache-
lor party "where he had been seen drinking."' 5 Also, one rescue
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. Rhode Island General Laws § 31-27-2 (1996) states in relevant
part:
(a) Whoever operates or otherwise drives any vehicle in the state while
under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, drugs, toluene, or any con-
trolled substance as defined in chapter 28 of title 21, or any combination
thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of this section.
(b)(1) Any person charged under subsection (a) of this section whose blood
alcohol concentration is one-tenth of one percent (. 1%) or more by weight as
shown by a chemical analysis of blood, breath, or urine sample shall be
guilty of violating subsection (a) of this section. This provision shall not
preclude a conviction based on other admissible evidence. Proof of guilt
under this section may also be based on evidence that the person charged
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, toluene, or any con-
trolled substance defined in chapter 28 of title 21, or any combination
thereof, to a degree which rendered such person incapable of safely oper-
ating a vehicle. The fact that any person charged with violating this sec-
tion is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug shall not
constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
13. See Guido, 698 A.2d at 732.
14. See id.
15. Id.
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worker noticed "a slight odor of alcohol" coming from Guido.16 An-
other rescue worker found an "open, partially filled bottle of beer
on the front floor of [Guido's] car."17
On May 18, 1993, three days after the accident, Sergeant
Larry Gwaltney (Gwaltney) of the Westerly Police Department re-
quested subpoenas from a statewide grand jury sitting in Kent
County.' 8 The subpoenas were needed to obtain Rhode Island
Hospital's medical records documenting the blood-alcohol levels of
both Anderson and Guido.19 Gwaltney requested that he "be made
an agent of the grand jury for return of service."20 He indicated
that he needed the medical records to assist in the investigation of
a serious motor-vehicle accident. The grand jury granted
Gwaltney's requests. The subpoenas authorized Gwaltney to re-
ceive the records rather than compel the hospital's record keeper to
appear in court.21
Gwaltney served the hospital, which made no objection.
Gwaltney obtained the medical records, which contained the infor-
mation on Guido's blood-alcohol level. 22 Guido never consented to
the release of his medical records. 23 Rather than submit the
records to the grand jury, Gwaltney handed them over to the Attor-
ney General's office, which used the records to determine "probable
cause for the filing of a criminal information in June of 1993."24 By
filing the criminal information, the Attorney General pre-empted
any indictment by the grand jury that had issued the subpoenas.25
Guido filed several motions prior to trial to suppress the hospi-
tal records. 26 He argued that his Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated because the blood-alcohol evidence contained in the
medical records was privileged medical information. 27 Guido also
contended that the grand jury had been misused by the Attorney
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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General's office. 28 He moved for dismissal due to lack of probable
cause.29 The Rhode Island Superior Court denied Guido's motions,
and he was tried before a jury.30
At trial, both the State and Guido offered expert testimony by
accident-reconstruction experts. 31 Joseph Cosentino (Cosentino) of
the Westerly Police Department, the State's expert, based his opin-
ions on "firsthand observations of the evidence at the scene."32 He
testified that "the point of impact occurred on Anderson's side of
the roadway."33 Yau Wu, Ph.D., Guido's expert, opined that the
impact took place on Guido's side of the road.34 Dr. Wu's opinion
was not based on firsthand observation. Guido was subsequently
convicted and appealed from that conviction. 35
BACKGROUND
In 1996, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided State v. Col-
lins,36 a case which bears a close factual resemblance to the Guido
case.3 7 Collins presented the court with the issue of admissibility
of blood-alcohol test results performed independently by hospital
personnel in the course of their procedural protocol.38 The Collins
court performed an in-depth analysis of the "drunk driving stat-
ute" and the requirements for the admissibility of blood-alcohol
test results.3 9 In Collins, the defendant had been involved in an
auto accident and was suspected by police of being under the influ-
28. See id. at 732-33.
29. See id. at 733.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. 679 A.2d 862 (R.I. 1996).
37. See generally id.
38. See id. at 864.
39. See id. Rhode Island General Laws § 31-27-2 (1996) details the conditions
under which such tests will be admissible:
(c) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, evidence as to the amount of intoxicating liquor, toluene, or any con-
trolled substance as defined in chapter 28 of title 21, or any combination
thereof in the defendant's blood at the time alleged as shown by a chemi-
cal analysis of the defendant's breath, blood, or urine or any other bodily
substance shall be admissible and competent, provided that evidence is
presented that the following conditions have been complied with:
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ence of alcohol. 40 The arresting officer told the defendant of "his
right to an attorney and his right to refuse chemical testing."41 At
the hospital, the "defendant indicated that he did wish to speak
with an attorney before submitting to a chemical test."4 2 Unable to
reach his lawyers, the defendant refused to speak with the police
or submit to chemical testing.43
At trial, the results of a blood-serum alcohol analysis were ad-
mitted into evidence." Hospital personnel performed this test on
(1) The defendant has consented to the taking of the test upon which
the analysis is made. Evidence that the defendant had refused to submit
to the test shall not be admissible unless defendant elects to testify.
(2) A true copy of the report of the test result was mailed within sev-
enty-two (72) hours of the taking of the test to the person submitting to a
breath test.
(3) Any person submitting to a chemical test of blood, urine, or other
body fluids shall have a true copy of the report of the test result mailed to
him or her within thirty (30) days following the taking of the test.
(4) The test was performed according to methods and with equipment
approved by the director of the department of health of the state of Rhode
Island and by an authorized individual.
(5) Equipment used for the conduct of the tests by means of breath
analysis had been tested for accuracy within thirty (30) days preceding
the test by personnel qualified as hereinbefore provided, and breathalyzer
operators shall be qualified and certified by the department of health
within three hundred sixty-five (365) days of the test.
(6) The person arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, toluene, or any controlled
substance as defined in chapter 28 of title 21, or, any combination thereof
in violation of subsection (a) of this section was afforded the opportunity to
have an additional chemical test and the officer arresting or so charging
the person informed the person of this right and afforded him or her a
reasonable opportunity to exercise the same, and a notation to this effect
is made in the official records of the case in the police department. Re-
fusal to permit an additional chemical test shall render incompetent and
inadmissible in evidence the original report.
Id.
40. See Collins, 679 A.2d at 863.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 864. On average, blood-serum alcohol levels measure roughly 16
percent higher than blood-alcohol levels. Hence, for legal purposes, defendant's
blood-alcohol level was 0.242 percent, rather than 0.281 percent, as the doctor in
charge of the Rhode Island Hospital trauma unit on the night of the accident testi-
fied at trial. See id.
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the night of the accident. 45 In addressing the defendant's claim
that such evidence should have been suppressed by the trial court,
the Collins court referred to its holding in State v. Lussier,46 in
which the court developed a bright-line distinction between tests
resulting from law-enforcement activity and those done by hospital
personnel.47 The Collins court concluded that the drunk-driving
"statute [was] inapplicable to the facts in [this] case in which
chemical tests were administered by hospital personnel in the ordi-
nary course of administering medical treatment."48
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court divided its opinion into
three sections to address directly the three points raised on appeal
by the defendant: (1) the search, (2) the privilege and (3) the grand
jury. Each will be discussed accordingly below.
The Search
The court first addressed Guido's argument that the acquisi-
tion of the medical records amounted to a search requiring a war-
rant under the Fourth Amendment. 49 The court agreed with the
trial court's conclusion that no state action was taken when the
blood tests were performed, since this was a matter of hospital pro-
tocol "rather than at the command of law enforcement."50 How-
ever, the court believed that state action was involved when the
grand jury authorized the subpoenas.51 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that no Fourth Amendment protections were required. 52
The court detailed the use of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule in similar cases.53 Quoting State v. Pailon,54 the court
stated that that the exclusionary rule is targeted at police or
prosecutorial actions, and "is not triggered by the actions of private
45. See id.
46. 511 A.2d 958 (R.I. 1986).
47. See Collins, 679 A.2d at 865 (citing State v. Lussier, 511 A.2d at 961).
48. Id.
49. See Guido, 698 A.2d at 733.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. 590 A.2d 858, 861 (R.I. 1991).
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persons."55 The Guido court stressed that the withdrawal of blood
here was performed by hospital personnel according to procedures
developed "to assist hospital personnel in electing medical pre-
scription and treatment rather than at the direction of state au-
thorities."5 6 As a result, the court concluded, there was no state
action and, therefore, "no Fourth Amendment concern."5 7
The court acknowledged Guido's argument regarding the dis-
tinction between the hospital procedure and Sergeant Gwaltney's
obtaining medical records by state action via the grand jury pro-
cess.58 In addressing this argument, the court asserted that Guido
"had no legitimate Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in
[the hospital's] medical records relating to his emergency treat-
ment."59 The court set out the general rule regarding the circum-
stances under which an expectation of privacy arises.60 Citing
State v. Bjerke,6 ' the court made it clear that the expectation of
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment must be "one that so-
ciety at large would recognize as reasonable."62 Building on this,
the court concluded that Guido had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in his medical records.6 3 Therefore, if no privacy interest
was invaded, then the seized evidence could be introduced. 64
The Privilege
Next, the court addressed Guido's argument that his medical
records were privileged under the Confidentiality of Health-Care
Information Act (Act).65 After briefly setting out the general rule
55. Guido, 698 A.2d at 733 (quoting Pailon, 590 A.2d at 861).
56. Id. at 733.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997).
62. Guido, 698 A.2d at 733.
63. See id. at 734.
64. See id.
65. See id. The Confidentiality of Health-Care Information Act, section 5-
37.3-4 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or as otherwise specifically pro-
vided by law, a patient's confidential health care information shall not be
released or transferred without the written consent of such patient or his
or her authorized representative, on a consent form meeting the require-
ments of subsection (d), a copy of any notice used pursuant to subsection
1998] 483
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of the statute as expressed in Bartlett v. Danti,66 the court rejected
Guido's argument.67
In supporting its conclusion, the Guido court opined that the
statute could not preclude access to the types of medical records at
issue in this case.68 The court referred to its conclusion in Bartlett
which stated that section 5-37.3-6 of the Rhode Island General
Laws,69 when read together with section 5-37.3-4(a), allows the pa-
tient to "decide with impunity whether to permit access to" rele-
vant medical records. 70 The Bartlett court found the statute
unconstitutional in that it removed from the courts the ultimate
decision of admissibility. 71 The Guido court concluded that there
was an equally violative aspect of section 5-37.3-4, which would
allow a defendant to conceal evidence of intoxication at his discre-
tion.7 2 Guido's reading of the statute would result in "a serious
impediment to the Judiciary's ability to carry out its function in a
large variety of criminal cases."73 Therefore, the court rejected
Guido's argument.7 4
(d), and of any signed consent shall upon request, be provided to the pa-
tient prior to his or her signing a consent form.
Provided however, that any and all managed care entities and managed
care contractors writing policies in the state are hereby prohibited from
providing any information related to enrollees which is personal in nature
and could reasonably lead to identification of an individual and is not es-
sential for the compilation of statistical data related to enrollees, to any
international, national, regional or local medical information data base.
Provided further however, that this provision would not restrict or other-
wise prohibit the transfer of information to the department of health to
carry out its statutory duties and responsibilities.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-4 (Supp. 1997).
66. 503 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1986). Essentially, Bartlett held that pursuant to the
statute, a patient's confidential health-care information could not be released with-
out the patient's written consent. See id. at 517.
67. Guido, 698 A.2d at 734.
68. See id.
69. This statute is a sister provision of the Act and is concerned with court
proceedings related to confidential health-care information. See id.
70. Guido, 698 A.2d at 734 (quoting Bartlett, 503 A.2d at 517).
71. See Bartlett, 503 A.2d at 517.
72. Guido, 698 A.2d at 734.
73. Id.
74. See id.
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The Grand Jury
Guido's final argument was that the Attorney General abused
the grand-jury system.v5 He argued that Gwaltney, in his tempo-
rary role as a grand-jury agent, compromised the secrecy of the
process when he presented the medical records to the Attorney
General. 76 Guido further asserted that the grand jury's power was
usurped when the subpoenaed records were used to prepare the
criminal information without the grand jury's involvement. 77
Guido argued that such action constituted a violation of his rights
under the Confidentiality of Health-Care Information Act as well
as the state and federal Constitutions.78
The court began its discussion by placing the grand jury's role
in perspective.7 9 After setting out the text of Article I, section 7 of
the Rhode Island Constitution,80 the court distinguished the state-
charging process from that of the federal process.8 ' The state pro-
vides for a defendant to be charged by an attorney general's infor-
mation in addition to a grand jury indictment.8 2 The court has
traditionally recognized the state grand jury's powers as those that
existed at common law.83
Citing an advisory opinion,84 the Guido court made clear that
the protections afforded at common law were codified by the fram-
ers of the Rhode Island Constitution, specifically the language of
section 7.8r The court then explained the two functions of the
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 734-35.
78. See id. at 735.
79. See id. The court noted that the grand jury serves a dual role in its capac-
ity to indict, as well in its investigative capacity. See id. (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). The court concluded that the grand jury,
when acting in its investigative capacity, is generally not restrained by technical
rules of evidence and procedure when compelling the production of evidence. See
id.
80. See id. Article I, section 7 provides in relevant part: "[No person shall be
held to answer for any.., felony unless on presentment of indictment by a grand
jury or on information in writing signed by the attorney-general.. . ." R.I. Const.
art. I, § 7.
81. See Guido, 698 A.2d at 735.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Guido, 698 A.2d at 735 (citing Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. 20, 4
A.2d 487 (1939)).
85. See id.
19981 485
486 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387
grand jury, investigating and indicting.8 6 In its indicting capacity,
the grand jury acts as a shield, evaluating the sufficiency of evi-
dence to support holding an accused for trial.8 7 The court con-
cluded that the grand jury's investigative function acts as a sword
in uncovering criminal conduct.88
Recognizing the investigative function that was at issue in this
case, the court stated that such authority was broad.89 The court
clarified this role of the grand jury by reference to the United
States Supreme Court case of Branzburg v. Hayes,90 which stated
that "the scope of [grand jury] inquiries is not to be limited nar-
rowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of
the investigation."91 The Guido court drove home this philosophy
by stating that a grand jury is typically not restrained by the types
of evidentiary rules that dictate the conduct of criminal trials.9
2
Moreover, the Guido court stated that grand juries often work
with the assistance of the Attorney General's office as well as po-
lice investigators. 93 Subsequently, it would "continue to recognize
the validity of [the] relationship between the Office of the Attorney
General and [the] state grand juries."94 Therefore, the court re-
jected Guido's argument that the secrecy of the grand-jury proceed-
ings was compromised when medical records subpoenaed by the
grand jury were given to the Attorney General's office. 95
CONCLUSION
In Guido, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was faced with a
number of issues relating to the admissibility of medical records in
a criminal case. Although the court took pains to explain fully the
essential relationship between the Attorney General and grand ju-
ries,9 6 the major point of this case involves the admissibility of the
medical records as evidence in a driving-under-the-influence case.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
91. Guido, 698 A.2d at 735 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688).
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338. 343 (1974)).
93. See id. at 736.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
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To that end, the court has made it clear that, if a blood test is per-
formed on an individual while receiving emergency medical treat-
ment in accordance with hospital protocol, then the results of that
test will not be shielded by the Fourth Amendment 97 or the state's
Confidentiality of Health-Care Information Act.98
Michael F. Drywa, Jr.
97. See id. at 733
98. See id. at 734.
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Johnson, 688 A.2d 285 (R.I. 1997).
The reliability of a witness's in-court identification is determined
by examining all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
identification to establish an independent basis of reliability, so as
to not violate the defendant's due-process rights.
In State v. Johnson,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that, for a witness's in-court identification of a defendant to be con-
sidered reliable, and therefore not violative of defendant's due-pro-
cess rights, the identification must pass an independent-reliability
test.2 The independent-reliability test requires the trial court to
determine if the witness's identification has a basis for reliability
considering all the facts and circumstances.3 In Johnson, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion to suppress a witness's in-court identification, which the
defendant argued lacked reliability due to the witness's admitted
drug addiction. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On April 6, 1993, the defendant, Wilfret Johnson (Johnson)
visited Ivonne Otero (Otero) and her common-law husband, Wilson
Velasquez (Velasquez), at their third-floor apartment.5 Johnson
had supplied Otero with cocaine which she sold on his behalf.6
Johnson had come to collect the proceeds from the sale.7 However,
Velasquez had apparently spent the drug-sale proceeds.8 Johnson,
upon learning this, took Velasquez down to the ground floor.9
Once there, Johnson proceeded to beat and strike Velasquez in the
face and head, while Otero watched the beating from the third-
floor window. 10 After Johnson had finished battering Velasquez,
1. 688 A.2d 285 (R.I. 1997) (per curiam).
2. See id. at 287; see, e.g., State v. Andrade, 657 A.2d 538 (R.I. 1995); State v.
Mastracchio, 612 A.2d 698 (R.I. 1992); State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249 (R.I. 1992);
In re Richard L., 479 A.2d 103 (R.I. 1984).
3. See Johnson, 688 A.2d at 287; see also State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290
(R.I. 1990).
4. Johnson, 688 A.2d at 287.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 286-87.
7. See id. at 287.
8. See id. at 286.
9. See id. at 287.
10. See id.
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he called up to Otero to "come down and see how pretty [he] left
[Velasquez]."11 Upon reaching Velasquez, Otero found him bleed-
ing and unconscious with his forehead and neck badly swollen. Ve-
lasquez was taken to Rhode Island Hospital where he remained for
six months until he was transferred to Zambarano Hospital and
later moved to a New York nursing home. 12 As a result of the as-
sault, Velasquez must be fed through a feeding tube and cannot
communicate.' 3
Police obtained a warrant and arrested Johnson after Otero
identified Velasquez's assailant as 'Will from Putnam Street."14
At trial in superior court, a jury found Johnson guilty of assault
with a dangerous weapon resulting in serious bodily injuries. 15 On
appeal, Johnson argued that Otero's in-court identification should
have been suppressed by the trial judge because Otero was an ad-
mitted drug addict. 16 The trial judge had denied the defendant's
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 286.
16. See id. at 287. In addition to the identification issue, the defendant also
presented three additional grounds for appeal. First, he argued that it was an
error for the trial judge to allow Otero to testify about her husband's medical condi-
tion. See id. The supreme court held that Otero could testify as to her personal
observations and that she was not offering a medical diagnosis. See id. Second,
the defendant claimed that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the charge
against him pursuant to his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial since 14
months had elapsed from the filing of the information to the trial. See id. at 288.
Applying the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the supreme
court concluded that the trial judge was not in error because the defendant had
failed to vigorously assert his speedy trial right, and he was not prejudiced by the
14-month time span. See id. Third, the defendant argued that the trial judge had
erred by failing to pass the case after the defendant indicated his lack of confidence
in his appointed counsel. See id. Defendant had filed a pro se motion to have his
attorney dismissed and the appointed attorney also filed a motion to withdraw
prior to the commencement of trial. A superior court judge, other than the trial
judge, denied the attorney's motion. See id. The supreme court held that there
was no error and the trial judge had not abused his discretion for failure to abort
the trial sua sponte on the last day of trial-when defendant once again asserted
his apprehensions regarding his appointed counsel-since defendant had not
moved for a mistrial. See id. Additionally, the supreme court indicated that, had
the trial judge declared a mistrial, double-jeopardy issues would have been impli-
cated. See id.
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motion to suppress because, in his view, Otero's identification "had
an independent basis of reliability."17
BACKGROUND
In State v. Camirand,'8 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that in order to determine whether identification procedures vio-
lated a defendant's due-process rights, a court should employ a
two-step procedure. 19 First, the trial court must determine if "the
procedures used in the identification were unnecessarily sugges-
tive."20 Second, if any of these procedures are deemed suggestive,
then it must be determined "whether the identification lacks in-
dependent reliability despite the suggestive nature of the identifi-
cation procedure." 2' In determining the independent reliability of
witness identification, the Camirand court listed five factors to be
considered: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal;
(2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the wit-
ness's descriptions of the criminal; (4) the level of the witness's cer-
tainty at the confrontation and (5) the time interval between the
crime and the confrontation. 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In Johnson, the first issue addressed by the court was the de-
fendant's argument that the in-court identification by Otero should
have been suppressed because of her admitted drug addiction.23
The court held that the trial judge's decision that Otero's in-court
identification of Johnson had an independent basis of reliability
17. Id. at 287. At trial, a second witness to the beating, Tonia Heyder, testi-
fied that on April 6, 1993, she had looked out her window and saw a "taller man
stomping or kicking a person on the ground." Id. The defendant presented two
cousins as alibi witnesses who testified that the defendant was with them the
night of the beating until eleven p.m. making plans for a birthday party. See id.
18. 572 A.2d 290 (R.I. 1990).
19. See id. at 293. This two-step procedure was first formally articulated by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State u. Nicoletti, 471 A.2d 613 (R.I. 1984).
The supreme court adopted the procedure from the United States Supreme Court
decision in Manson u. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), which, in turn, had formal-
ized this test from its prior holding in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
20. Camirand, 572 A.2d at 293.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 294.
23. Johnson, 688 A.2d at 287.
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was "amply supported by the evidence." 24 The court then stated
the general precept that "[rieliability is the linchpin of admissibil-
ity-of-identification evidence."25
The Johnson court identified the factors which contributed to
the reliability of the in-court identification. 26 The court noted that
the trial judge observed that Otero had known Johnson for three
months, and she had had frequent contacts with him. Further-
more, the court found that there was no evidence of a suggestive
pretrial identification procedure. Also, Otero's competence to tes-
tify was, in the first instance, a factual matter for the trial judge to
decide, while her credibility was a question of fact properly left to
the jury.27 In concluding its holding on the identification issue, the
court stated that "the identification was certainly reliable enough
to be admitted" based on the totality of the circumstances, and was
also sufficiently credible.28
CONCLUSION
In its holding in State v. Johnson, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court continued to reaffirm its adherence to the rules governing
witness identification as established by the United States Supreme
Court in Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite. Witness iden-
tification of a defendant will properly be admitted so long as the
trial judge is satisfied that the identification has an independent
basis of reliability considering the totality of the circumstances.
By employing this independent-reliability test, the court will as-
sure that the defendant's right to due process is not violated.
Michael F. Drywa, Jr.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court references Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) after this
quote, which, although it is clearly supported in context by Biggers, must be prop-
erly credited to Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
26. Johnson, 688 A.2d at 287.
27. See id.
28. Id.
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